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ABSTRACT 
 
Service adaptations, when there is changing demand or problems regarding the service 
provision, constitute a major issue in Public Private Partnerships (PPPs). So far, studies 
have explained the ex post adaptation problems by the distorted incentives for the private 
public-service provider to invest in adaptation efforts. However, as any PPP is between a 
public authority and a private public-service provider (no market price), public authorities 
have also an important role to play in the adaptation of the private public-service provision 
over time. This paper studies how the contractual design of PPPs affects accountability and 
incentives for contractually unanticipated service adaptations. More specifically, we 
observe worldwide two main different contracting out procedures: the concession contract 
and the availability contract. The main difference between these two contractual practices 
concerns the demand risk, which is borne by private providers in the first case and by 
public authorities in the second case. This paper shows that there are two main effects of 
the contractual design on accountability. (1) Concession contracts, compared to availability 
contracts, motivate more public authorities from investigating and responding to public 
demands. This is due to the fact that under a concession contract consumers are 
empowered, i.e. have the possibility to oust the private provider, which provides public 
authorities with more credibility in side-trading. (2) Concession contracts can give greater 
adaptation effort incentives to private providers than availability contracts, since, if private 
providers bear the demand risk, they can receive private gains from implementing the 
adaptation. The striking policy implication of this paper is then that the trend towards a 
greater resort to contracts where private providers bear little or no demand risk may not be 
optimal in terms of allocative efficiency.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Reforming public-service delivery occupies a central position in the current policy agenda in 
the world. Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) are considered as an alternative model to the 
traditional public provision for public services, and they are now worldwide used2. 
Nevertheless, many concerns have been raised regarding this emerging organisational model. 
The most stringent worries concern the ex post adaptation inflexibilities inherent to these long 
term contracts. Adaptation is important when consumers’ preferences change and improved 
policies or technologies are discovered. For example, it is difficult to get a good idea of what 
reasonable standards of quality will be like in 20 or 30 years time. In many university 
accommodation contracts, the quality standards mention microwave cookers which could not 
have been written into a contract 20 years ago (McWilliam 1997). As the major feature of 
PPPs is that they are long-term service contracts, it is highly likely that contracting parties 
will be unable to write complete contracts that cover all contingencies, and numerous are the 
cases that offer good illustrations of the difficulties for procuring authorities to reaching an 
agreement with private public-service providers on contractually unanticipated service 
adaptations. It is often mentioned that “[a] key concern with long-term PPP contracts is the 
level of flexibility that they offer to authorities to make changes either to the use of assets or 
to the level and type of services offered” (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2005). 
So far, studies have explained the ex post adaptation problems by the distorted incentives 
for the private public-service provider to invest in the research into innovative approaches to 
carrying out the service provision (Hart, Shleifer and Vishny 1997, Hart 2003, Bennett and 
Iossa 2006). Hart et al. (1997) show that if assets are owned by the private sector, then cost-
reducing changes can be introduced without renegotiation, since the sole contract with the 
public sector is on services. Thus the full benefit of such changes flows to the private owner 
and encourages efficiency. In contrast, benefits that improve service quality require 
renegotiation and the public body may be in a position to extract part of the benefit since the 
private owner has no alternative purchaser for the incremental gain. The effect is that the 
private owner receives less of the benefit of such changes and the incentives are weakened.  
None of them (except Ellman 2006) approach this issue from a political accountability 
point of view; none of them give an active role to public authorities. However, public 
authorities have also an important role to play in the adaptation of the private provision of 
public services over time for the following reasons. First, any PPP is between a public 
authority and a private public-service provider; that is there is no direct democracy (the public 
cannot vote directly to select and oust the private provider). Second, there is no market 
                                                 
2 The surge in PPPs is reflected in the financial press. For example, articles in the Financial Times mentioning 
this concept increased twenty-fold over the last decade, from 50 in 1995 to 1,153 in 2004 (Engel et al. 2007). 
The case of PPPs in the transportation sector is particularly compelling. Recently, 20 U.S. states passed 
legislation permitting the operation of public-private partnerships to build, finance and operate toll-roads, bridges 
and tunnels. See “Paying on the Highway to Get Out of First Gear.” New York Times, April 28, 2005. 
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accountability of private providers, since the price applied to consumers, if any, is a regulated 
price, not a market price. Finally, public authorities, as elected delegates of consumers, are 
duty bound to discover adaptations and consumers’ preferences and to exercise pressure on 
the private provider to adapt the public service to satisfy the changes in the effective 
consumers demand. 
It seems then that political accountability, i.e. the responsiveness of public authorities to 
consumers concerns, has also to be considered when one aims to tackle the issue of the 
inefficient development of PPPs over time. In other words, we have to consider public 
authorities as active players instead of passive bystanders of the general efficiency of PPPs. 
Ellman (2006) is the first to theoretically raise the question of the accountability of public 
authorities in the adaptation over time of the private provision of public services. More 
precisely, in this paper, the author compares private with public provision regarding political 
and public accountability.  
By contrast, in this paper, I investigate how the contractual design of PPPs affects 
accountability mechanism. More specifically, we can observe two main contract types for 
delegating public services to private operators: contracts where private providers bear no 
demand risk, designated as availability contracts, and contracts where private providers bear 
the demand risk, namely concession contracts, which have broadly the same meaning 
everywhere. Both are long-term, global contracts on the design, building, financing and 
operation of a public service (roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, prisons, government 
accommodation, computer systems, Ministry of Defence training simulators, and other 
activities) and consist in output specifications systems. Both types of contracts can be 
considered as fixed-price contracts (the procuring authority offers the private provider a 
prespecified price for completing the project in both contracts). They do not differ in the 
magnitude of implication of the private operator, both contracting procedures formally 
delegate to the private provider sufficient residual control rights to provide the service free of 
interference. The main difference between these two contractual practices concerns the 
demand risk, which is borne by private providers in the first case and by public authorities in 
the second case. Thus, under a concession contract, the private provider’s remuneration 
depends on the demand for the public service whereas under an availability contract, it comes 
from service payments by the procuring authority according to performance criteria (the 
contract specifies penalties in case the performance and quality criteria are not met; there is 
therefore no link with the service demand).  
The traditional model of PPPs in the world has been the concession contract. According to 
the World Bank private participation in infrastructure database, between 1990 and 2000, 
overall 65% of the projects in Latin America and the Caribbean were adjudicated as 
concessions. The concession contract is also the most common form of PPP in Europe except 
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in the UK, where, even though concession contracts are used, public authorities resort above 
all to availability contracts, designated by the acronym PFI “the Private Finance Initiative” 
and its successor the Public Private Partnerships (PPP) (Grout 1997, HM Treasury 2000). But 
the concession contracting model has increasingly come under fire in recent times in 
developing countries as well as in developed countries (Engel et al. 2002, 2006, Guasch 2004, 
Estache 2006). The main criticisms are related with the high incidence of renegotiation 
observed under these contracts due mainly to the demand overestimation, strategic or not, by 
private providers in their bids (Athias and Nunez 2007). The trend has been therefore to not 
impose the demand risk on private providers anymore. Availability contracts are therefore 
increasingly being adopted around the world to move away from the concession model. This 
is particularly pronounced in Europe, where countries have recently promulgated guidelines 
so as to bring in the availability contract as an alternative to the concession contract, e.g. the 
June 2004 act in France instituting the new “contrats de partenariat”. 
While it is commonly thought that availability contracts are used when it is not possible to 
make users pay or when the services are not profitable, we observe in practice, on the one 
hand, that some contracts specify that the service provider is remunerated according to the 
service demand even if users do not pay (they are most often known under the name “shadow 
toll contracts”) and, on the other hand, that procuring authorities resort to availability 
contracts, and hence make the remuneration of the service provider dependent on continuity 
of service supply, while users pay a toll to them. Thus, it appears that the choice between a 
concession and an availability contract, that is to say between a contract in which the private 
provider bears the demand risk and a contract in which it does not, depends neither on the 
ability to make users pay nor on the profitability of the service in question.  
Whereas the literature has been prolific regarding the concession contracts and their 
potential pitfalls, very few have been said about availability contracts. It is nonetheless 
possible to draw some lessons from the experiences in the UK. Over 900 PFI projects with a 
capital value of £40bn have been signed in the UK, with about 500 of them operational (HM 
Treasury 2004). 
To investigate how the contractual design of PPPs – availability versus concession 
contracts – affects not only private providers’ incentives to adapt the service provision, but 
also, and above all, public authorities’ incentives to be responsive to consumers concerns, I 
present an incomplete contract theory model in which: (1) public authorities (e.g. government, 
mayors) are involved in adaptation, i.e. exert effort to respond to consumers demands; (2) 
consumers may have the power to sanction the private manager; (3) private providers exert 
efforts to cut costs and to discover adaptations.  
First, I show that public authorities end up having to pay more for unanticipated desirable 
service adaptations when the private provider does not bear the demand risk than when it 
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does. This is due to the fact that under a concession contract consumers are empowered, i.e. 
have the ability to sanction and oust the private provider, which provides public authorities 
with more credibility in side-trading and thus greater incentives to be responsive. Second, I 
show that contracts where private providers bear the demand risk most often dominate 
contracts where they bear little or no demand risk regarding private providers’ cost reducing 
incentives. This is due to the fact that when the demand risk is on private providers, they may 
have some incentives to internalise the effects of their cost-reducing investments. Third, I 
show that concession contracts can give greater adaptation effort incentives to private 
providers than availability contracts. This is due to the fact that there might be private gains 
from implementing the adaptation under a concession contract, so that the private provider 
will implement the adaptation without any further inducement.  
As a consequence, I show that there is a lower matching with consumers preferences over 
time under an availability contract than under a concession contract. In other words, I show 
that contracts in which private providers do not bear the demand risk rule more out the 
accountability – regarding service adaptations – of public authorities and providers to 
individual consumers than when they bear the demand risk. The striking policy implication of 
this paper would be that the trend towards a greater resort to availability contracts, or more 
generally to contracts where private providers bear little or no demand risk, so as to avoid the 
high renegotiation incidence observed under concession contracts, may not be optimal. This is 
all the more true that the belief that private providers do not bear a demand risk in availability 
contracts could be an illusion.  
The main contribution of this paper is to highlight the importance, so far neglected, of the 
political accountability in the private public-service provision, and to shed some insights into 
the impact of the contractual design of PPPs on this accountability mechanism. In addition, 
this paper also contributes to the broader literature on the political economy of government 
responsiveness. It is in fact related to the literature on voucher provision of public services 
and demonstrates that empowering consumers of public services strengthens incentives for 
governments to be responsive.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the related literature. In section 3, I 
illustrate the underlying logic in the context of three examples. Section 4 presents the basic 
model of political accountability under both types of private provision and solves it. Section 5 
extends the model with the endogeneisation of the effort of the private provider and discusses 
the complementarity or substitutability of public authorities’ and private providers’ incentives. 
Section 6 extends the model with the consideration of the risk of default of public authorities 
when private providers do not bear the demand risk. Section 7 discusses the results and 
speculates about the application of the analysis to different sectors. Section 8 concludes.  
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2. RELATED LITERATURE 
My work is linked to the incomplete contract literature, while focusing on the contractual 
design, instead of ownership structures. Hart et al. (1997) show that if assets are owned by the 
private sector, then benefits that improve service quality require renegotiation and the public 
body may be in a position to extract part of the benefit since the private owner has no 
alternative purchaser for the incremental gain. The effect is that the private owner receives 
less of the benefit of such changes and the incentives are weakened. As a consequence, Hart 
(2003) advocates that, where build contracts are easy to specify but service contracts are not, 
then it is useful to have a conventional provision (“unbundling” of the construction and 
operation stages). At the other extreme, where service contracts are easy to write and build 
contracts are difficult, the PPP approach may be particularly sensible. Bennett and Iossa 
(2006), in turn, show that PPPs will be optimal only when the innovation in the construction 
stage has a positive externality on operation and maintenance costs. 
In contrast with these studies, I approach the issue of contractually unanticipated service 
adaptation not only from the point of view of the distorted incentives for the private public-
service provider, but also from a political point of view. Ellman (2006) is the unique author to 
our knowledge that theoretically raises the question of the accountability of public authorities 
in private provision of public services. More precisely, in this paper, the author compares 
private with public provision regarding political and public accountability. To this end, he 
relies on the framework of Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) but considers that the 
government and the public are involved in service adaptation. He shows that privatisation can, 
first, demotivate the government from investigating and responding to public demands 
because privatisation allows the provider to hold up service adaptations, and, second, 
demotivate the public from mobilising to pressure for service adaptations, since providers 
indirectly hold up the public by inflating the government’s cost of implementing these 
adaptations. Thus, in this paper, the tradeoff is between public and private provision. In his 
model, privatisation takes implicitly only one form, the form of the availability contract (he 
assumes that private providers’ remuneration never depends on the demand), and private 
providers’ adaptation incentives do not vary with the governance structure. My model adds 
two novel features to the set-up of Ellman (2006): (1) consumers may have the ability to 
sanction and oust the private public-service provider according to the contractual design of 
PPP; (2) private providers’ adaptation incentives vary with the governance structure.  
My work is also linked to the literature on the political economy of government 
responsiveness. For instance, Besley and Burgess’s (2001 and 2002) model derives how 
governments become more responsive to people when people become more aware of how 
government actions affect them, which is determined by the freedom of the press. Also, 
Besley and Ghatak (2003) tackle the question of the best process by which service providers, 
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consumers and procuring authorities come together to create an organization. This could be 
governed by choice, as when a parent picks a school for their child, or by government policy. 
The authors show, in a non formalized way, that empowering consumers, by allowing them to 
choose between providers with different service provisions, is a potentially source of welfare 
improvements. They explain that empowering consumers means that the nature of the 
principal-agent problem changes. While the centralized model of public-service provision 
(illustrated in Figure 1) has two layers of agency problems: between consumers and elected 
officials and between the government and the service provider, the structure of the problem 
when consumers of public services are empowered (as shown in Figure 2), provides a closer 
link between them and service providers. Thus, empowering consumers can offer a better 
matching between consumers and providers, in other words a greater allocative efficiency.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
This approach underpins the representation developed in this paper of the accountability 
mechanism for service adaptations under the two differing contractual procedures. While the 
centralized model of public-service provision illustrated in Figure 1 corresponds to the 
accountability structure implied by an availability contract, the model in which consumers are 
empowered (Figure 2) fits with the accountability structure of a concession contract (or more 
generally of models in which private providers bear the demand risk, e.g. shadow toll 
contracts). As a matter of fact, under concession contracts, consumers are empowered to the 
extent that the remuneration of the private provider depends on the demand for the service. 
Thus, under such contracts, consumers have the power to oust the service provider by not 
using the service any more, depending on the availability of alternative options. Making the 
private provider bear the demand risk can then empower consumers, which can then lead to a 
better alignment on service provision preferences.  
 
3. EVIDENCE 
This section illustrates the underlying logic of the paper in the context of three case studies.  
3.1. THE SCHOOL CATERING CASE 
Figure 1 
Consumers  
 
Procuring authority 
 
Private public-service provider 
Figure 2 
Procuring authority         Consumers 
 
    Private public-service provider 
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The recent experience of the British government with school dinners offers a good example of 
the incentives provided by an availability contract, i.e. a contract in which the private provider 
does not bear the demand risk. According to Ellman (2006), “In the aftermath of a series of 
television reports on school diners by celebrity chef Jamie Oliver in early 2005, the 
government rushed to quench mounting public discontent over low quality committing to 
make improvements. However, new schools locked into 25-year contracts through private 
finance initiatives (PFIs) are finding that they cannot rid their menus of junk food despite the 
government’s pledge”.  
This case highlights the fact that, under an availability contract, if there is a shock in 
demand like a fundamental change in the consideration of healthy food by the public, the 
procuring authority has very low power to make the private provider adapt the service 
accordingly. By contrast, we can imagine that if the demand risk was on the private provider, 
i.e. its remuneration depends on the demand for the public service (in contrast to the fixed 
payment if performance criteria are met), the public would have had the possibility to oust the 
private provider in case of non-adaptation to their demand by, for instance, providing their 
children with a home-made lunch. This would have had consequently increased the credibility 
of the procuring authority to sideline the incumbent private provider for not adapting to 
healthier ingredients.  
This logic also applies in the following case of the London Underground Public Private 
Partnership. 
3.2. LONDON UNDERGROUND PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP 
The London Underground Public Private Partnership is a long-term PFI contract that provides 
for maintenance and upgrading work of the London underground (trains, tracks, signalling 
and stations). This is a thirty-year, £30bn contract between London Underground Limited and 
the main private service provider Metronet. Metronet holds two of the three thirty-year 
contracts to maintain track and trains covering the London underground network. One 
contract covers the Bakerloo, Central, Victoria and Waterloo & City deep-level Tube lines; 
the other covers the Metropolitan, District, Circle and other sub-surface lines that run in 
shallow tunnels. The service provider took over responsibility for the lines in April 2003. It 
followed a competitive process whereby the contract was awarded to the qualified bidder 
offering the specified service at the lowest price (availability charge). Monthly payment to 
Metronet derives from a performance adjusted Infrastructure Service Charge (ISC). In other 
words, the payment to Metronet, for the first period of the contract (the contract is divided in 
4 periods of 7,5 years), is composed of a fixed ISC (94,6% of the revenues determined for the 
first period) and of performance revenues (that account for 5,4% of the revenues determined 
for the first period of the contract). The performance revenues depend on the execution of the 
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renewal works. They are determined according to the statistics of incidents and performance 
of the two last years preceding the contract. There are four criteria:  
(+) Capability: technical capability of the lines, maximal capacity to reduce the durations of 
the trips; 
(+) Availability: time lost by users (trains speed reduction);  
(+) Ambience: global service quality perceived by, assessed by independent surveys; 
(-) Service points and Specific Projects: penalties are applied in case of failure to meet the 
specified standards (regarding mainly trains delayed). 
75% of the performance revenues stem from technical improvements (Capability). 
Moreover, in case of disputes, the contract specifies the intervention of an independent 
“Statutory Arbiter”, designated by the Secretary of State.  
The extent of Metronet's problems has been clear since November 2006, when the arbiter 
of the PPP contract said he expected the company to overspend by £750m in the first 7½ 
years of its contract, up to October 2010. Mr Livingstone, London’s Mayor, has for long 
assumed that London Underground would end up paying none of the £750m of overspending. 
Yet, Metronet is moving closer to initiating a formal independent review to decide who pays 
for a projected £750m cost overrun. Andrew Lezala, of Metronet Rail, went on: “"I respect 
the fact that there are large sums involved here and we are quite prepared to go through the 
extraordinary review process, and that's quite likely" (Robert Wright, April 25 2007).   
Whereas the grounds of this overspending are not clear, this case however highlights the 
fact that, in the framework of availability contracts, when there are problems regarding the 
service provision (not only regarding contractually unanticipated service adaptation), it is very 
difficult for the procuring authority to reach an agreement with the private provider. In this 
particular case of London Underground Public Private Partnership for instance, the private 
provider is not afraid to face a long settlement of dispute and huge costs. We could however 
imagine that if the demand risk was on Metronet, users would have been able to sanction 
Metronet for delivering a service of bad quality, and hence empowered London Underground 
in the negotiation process.  
3.3 COFIROUTE: THE EPISODE OF THE "SHIPWRECKED MEN OF THE ROAD" 
OF SAINT-ARNOULT-IN-YVELINES  
Cofiroute is the main French highway concessionaire. They operate under concession 
contracts, i.e. their remuneration depends on the demand for the highway and more 
particularly stems from the tolls charged to users.  
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January 4, 2003, the French Weather-Forecaster underestimates the extent of the falls of 
snow which will fall down on the French North and Centre, preventing the installation by 
Cofiroute of the provisions necessary to preserve the viability of base joint A10-A11. Thus, 
when plates of glaze appeared on this joint base, already dense circulation became completely 
blocked. The absence of measures such as the diversion of traffic and information of the users 
by Cofiroute increased the number of users blocked out of 60 km.  
After this event, there was a public discontent about the lack of suitable means in case of 
considerable falls of snow. As a consequence, Cofiroute invested in less heavy salting 
vehicles as well as in automatic salting systems located in crucial points. 
Thus, in contrast with the former ones, this case study highlights the fact that under a 
concession contract, in case of changing public demand or problems, service adaptation can 
occur.  
 
Thus, these various case studies highlight the fact that the underlying problem with 
availability contracts is that they often prevent the procuring authority from exploiting 
adaptation gains in the absence of the private provider’s cooperation. If a crucial change in 
demand or a fundamental problem in the way the public service is provided occurs, procuring 
authorities have very low power to lead private providers to adapt the service provision. This 
might be explained by the low credibility in side-trading procuring authorities have. By 
contrast, under a concession contract, consumers have the power to oust private service 
providers by sidelining them with alternative options. This strengthens the credibility of 
procuring authorities to replace or sideline the incumbent private provider for not adapting to 
consumers demands or dealing with provision problems, since in case of sidelining, the 
incumbent can experience negative profits (waste of economies of scope in side-trading are 
then largely reduced). So, it seems that under availability contracts, private providers can hold 
up the procuring authority from a greater share of its gain from adaptation than under 
concession contracts. This is what the model developed in the following section proposes to 
show.  
 
4. THE MODEL 
This section presents a simple model of the choice by procuring authorities between 
availability and concession contracts for the provision of a public service by a private 
provider (such as health care, transportation, water, education or school dinner catering), 
derived along the lines of Ellman (2006). I consider first the model in which the private 
public-service provider does not make any effort to adapt the service. I endogenise the 
accountability of procuring authorities (politicians) to changing consumers’ demands by 
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introducing a third party (the consumers of the public service) within Hart, Shleifer and 
Vishny’s framework.  
So, in the model, there are two players: a procuring authority PA  (e.g. a mayor, local 
government, or the national government) and the private service provider PM  (private 
manager), and a special third player, the users of the public service (the consumers) C, that 
can influence PA  and PM  but cannot contract with them. More specifically, I assume in this 
model that consumers play a role only through their ability to sanction the private provider 
when the latter bears the demand risk. In other words, consumers are considered as a semi-
player to the extent that I do not analyse the interactions between them and public authorities, 
assuming that public authorities always reflect consumers’ preferences. Such an assumption is 
motivated by the fact that we consider core public services, to which consumers are very 
sensitive, and hence the adaptations they require are most often politically salient.  
PA  organises the service provision on the consumers’ behalf. PA  always delegates the 
service provision to a private manager ( PM ), but can choose between a contract in which the 
private provider does not bear the demand risk (an availability contract) and a contract in 
which the private provider bears the demand risk (e.g. a concession contract) to do it. Both 
contracting procedures formally delegate to the private provider sufficient residual control 
rights to provide the service free of interference, and they both are long-term contracts (we 
assume of the same length). Nevertheless, under both types of contract, PA  and PM  may 
still need to negotiate to adapt their contract over time. So, ongoing negotiation is needed for 
adaptation in both cases. 
As already mentioned, there is one crucial difference between these two contractual 
forms. Under availability contracts, the remuneration of the private provider is not dependent 
on the demand but stems from service payments from PA  according to performance criteria. 
By contrast, by imposing on the private public-service provider bear the demand risk (either 
through users’ toll or through payments from PA  depending on the demand, as in shadow toll 
contracts), concession contracts empower consumers, i.e. make it possible for consumers to 
sanction PM  to the extent that if they do not use the service it provides, the private provider’s 
remuneration is affected. Nevertheless, we cannot speak about “direct democracy” in the 
sense that the contract remains between PA  and PM only, neither about market 
accountability since the the price (or toll if consumers pay) paid to PM  for the provision of 
the public service is the price regulated by the contract (not a market price). Thus, under both 
types of contract, if an adaptation is required, not only the adaptation but also and above all 
the price adaptation will have to be negotiated between PA  and PM . Service adaptation can 
therefore occur only if PA  and PM  reach an agreement on the adaptation and the price 
adaptation. The hope is then that PA  will pressure PM  to adapt the public service to satisfy 
the changes in the effective demand. The demand/availability distinction matters because it 
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affects what happens when PA  and PM  have to negotiate to make PM  adapt to 
unanticipated changes in the service provision.  
4.1. BENCHMARK MODEL 
At the start of their relationship, PA  and PM  negotiate a basic contract X , that can be either 
an availability contract or a concession contract. I assume that X  just compensates PM  for 
standard costs of provision, whatever the contractual design. 
 I do not consider the cost of public funds because, in both contractual procedures, the 
funding can either stem from users’ tolls or from public funds. I am only interested in whether 
the private provider bears the demand risk (in which case PM ’s remuneration can stem from 
public funds as in shadow-tolls contracts or from users’ tolls) or not (in which case PM ’s 
remuneration can stem from users’ tolls that are collected by PA  or from public funds).  
 X  generates a (net) payoff of b  for PA  and )(ew  for PM  where )(ew  is PM ’s cost 
advantage (over a standard provider) from investing e  in specialising to PA 3. In other words, 
I assume that this cost-reduction investment e  by PM  is fully relationship-specific, i.e. if 
PM  does not provide some service for PA , neither PM  nor PA  gets any benefit from e . I 
assume that e  is bounded so ],0[ ee∈ . As in HSV’s model, I assume that this cost-reduction 
investment is accompanied by a reduction in quality )(eq 4. 
The investment e  is not contractible and nor is his payoff implications )(ew  and )(eq . 
The following regularity assumptions guarantee sufficiency of first-order conditions. 
Assumption 1. 0)0( =w , 0)('0)('' ≥∀<< eewew  and .0)('lim,)('lim 0 =∞= ∞→→ + ewew ee  
Assumption 2. 00)('',0)(',0)0( ≥∀≥≥= eeqeqq . 
Assumption 3. 0'' >−qw , i.e. the net effect of cost reducing investments is always positive5.  
 Availability contract: the private provider does not bear the demand risk 
Under an availability contract, PM ’s overall payoff is eewt −+ )(0 , where 0t  is the payment 
that PM  receives for the provision of the basic public service. PM  does not internalise the 
adverse quality effect )(eq  as quality is noncontractible.  
PA ’s overall payoff is then )(0 eqtb −− .  
                                                 
3 Since in both contractual designs, PM  has control rights over the service provision, e  will be implemented 
unilaterally. 
4 However, it is not obvious that the quality effects of cost-reducing investments are only negative. Nevertheless, 
considering positive effects on quality of e  will not change the results of our model. 
5 This assumption may be strong but as I assume that e  is bounded, it is not that restrictive to assume that this 
assumption holds everywhere in the domain. It is in fact much less restrictive than assuming e  is unbounded 
and that this assumption holds everywhere, like in Hart, Shleifer and Vishny’s and related models. This 
assumption implies that we consider only public services for which PM ’s cost-reducing efforts provoke quality 
damages that are always smaller than the gains in cost reduction they entail. This assumption seems however to 
match the features of numerous public services for which quality criteria are contractible ex ante.  
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 Concession contract: the private provider bears the demand risk 
Under a concession contract, consumers are empowered to the extent that they can oust the 
private provider in case of non satisfaction with the service provision. The magnitude of this 
faculty depends mainly on the availability of alternative providers.6 So I use the parameter λ 
to capture the impact of the pressure exercised by consumers on PM ’s remuneration, 
where ]1,0[∈λ .7 For 0=λ , it is not necessary that all consumers switch to an alternative 
provision to make PM  experience negative profits. Indeed, the profitability of most 
concessions contracts is very sensitive to the demand, i.e. a marginal change of the demand 
can generate negative profits for the private provider. 
Under such a contract, PM  will then internalise the negative effect on quality of his cost-
reducing effort according to the value of λ. For instance, if we consider the case when 0=λ , 
PM  would not make any revenue if it does not internalise the quality effect of its cost-
reducing investment. Thus, in such a case, PM  will internalise the full adverse quality effect 
)(eq . Conversely, if 1=λ , PM  will not at all internalise the adverse quality effect of e , 
since its remuneration would be the same whether internalising )(eq  or not. 
Thus, if the impact of the pressure exercised by consumers on PM ’s remuneration is λ, 
PM ’s overall payoff is 
eeqewt −−−+ )()1()(0 λ  
PA ’s overall payoff is then )(0 eqtb λ−− . 
4.2. ADAPTATION AND POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
While PM  invests e  to cut costs, PA , as elected delegate of consumers, invests effort i  to 
discover what the consumers want and how to satisfy their demands. So i  represents PA ’s 
efforts to pay attention to consumers concerns about service quality. For instance, when there 
is a consumers’ demand for a concrete change, i  raises the probability that PA  recognises 
that the demand is serious and raises the probability that PA  works out how to satisfy 
consumers demands – in terms of pressure exercised on PM  to satisfy the change in effective 
consumers demand for instance. This effort permits then PA  and PM  to adapt the basic 
contract X  to changing consumers’ preferences.  
I assume that consumers pressure is independent of PA ’s attentiveness and contractual 
design.8  
                                                 
6 Note that it is not necessary that the alternative provisions are adapted to consumers’ preferences. Consumers 
can in fact decide to switch to an alternative provision that can even less match their preferences, so as to 
sanction the private provider. 
7 This boils down to assuming that the demand shock of an adaptation can only be negative. In other words, we 
assume that private providers’ remuneration is bounded and can only be reduced by the changing demand. 
8 I neglect the effort investments of consumers to discover improved policies and technologies because Ellman 
(2006) already models the public’s role in creating accountability and proves that private providers indirectly 
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I denote the corresponding adapted contract by Z , again with the non-contingent transfer 
set to just compensate the standard cost of provision. For simplicity, I assume that e  helps 
PM  to satisfy Z  so that PM ’s net payoff from enforcement of contract Z  is again )(ew . In 
other words e  reduces PM ’s costs by the same amount whether providing the basic or the 
adapted service. I also assume that e  has the same adverse effect on quality )(eq  whether 
providing the basic or the adapted service. PA ’s additional surplus from Z  is )(iv  
where 0≥v , increasing and concave in i , represents the net gain in consumers welfare from 
the adaptation. In other words, )(iv  measures PA ’s success in identifying or discovering 
adaptations that are valued by consumers9. So )(iv  can be interpreted as a measure of PA ’s 
responsiveness to consumers demand – how likely it is that PA  manages to please 
consumers. Attentiveness i  raises PA ’s ability and propensity to respond.  
If PA  pays PM  subsequent transfers (or toll increases) t  in case of adaptation, then, 
normalizing time discounting to zero, PA  and PM ’s overall payoffs from Z  are: 
When PM  does not bear the demand risk 
 itiveqtbuPA −−+−−= )()(0  
eewttuPM −++= )(0  
When PM  bears the demand risk 
itiveqtbuPA −−+−−= )()(0 λ  
eeqewttuPM −−−++= )()1()(0 λ  
The investment i  is not contractible and nor is its payoff implications )(iv . The following 
regularity assumption guarantees sufficiency of first-order conditions. 
Assumption 4. 0)('0)('',0)0( >∀<<= iivivv  and .00)('lim,)('lim 0 ≥∀=∞= ∞→→ + iiviv ii  
Parties are risk-neutral and PA  has rational expectation about the renegotiation process 
when it makes its investments, i.e. it can make correct calculations about the expected returns 
from any action. I assume information is symmetric and PM  and PA  negotiate a symmetric 
Nash bargain.10 So Z  is enforced in equilibrium. Contractual design and the availability of 
                                                                                                                                                        
holdup consumers by inflating the procuring authority’s cost of implementing these adaptations. Thus, the higher 
the hold-up of the procuring authority’s gains from adaptation, the lower the pressure of consumers. Considering 
consumers’ effort will therefore not change the results but will strengthen the dominance of the contract for 
which the procuring authority’s incentives are higher. In addition, we can consider that consumers have always 
binding time and budget constraints. 
9 If we consider that procuring authorities are not benevolent and then have for only objective the maximisation 
of their re-election chances, the adaptations required by consumers will have to be also politically salient. Again, 
I do not consider the case when consumers’ and public authorities’ benefits from adaptation are not proportional 
to the extent that I consider core public services, to which consumers are very sensitive.  
10 Thus, following Hart-Shleifer-Vishny (1997), I assume that the public authority does not maximize the global 
surplus during renegotiations: its utility function is given by the welfare of the rest of society, excluding the 
private operator. A justification for this is that the political process aligns the public authority’s and society’s 
interests (since the private operator has negligible voting power, his interests receive negligible weight). Of 
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alternative providers matter because they affect default outcomes in bargaining and hence the 
equilibrium choices of i  and e . I capture these effects in a simple four-stage model. Timing: 
Stage 1: PA  chooses the contract design (Concession contract, Availability contract) 
for contract X  and negotiates with PM  over stage 4 contract X, fixing the basic 
remuneration of the service provider 0t . 
Stage 2: PA  and PM  sink their investments i  and e . I assume for now that the 
private provider does not invest in the research into innovative approaches to carrying 
out the service provision; this assumption is dropped in Section 5. 
Stage 3: Renegotiation takes places to allow the adaptation to be implemented in the 
service provision: PA  and PM  negotiate over stage 4 the contract Z  and additional 
transfer t  (or toll increases). 
 Stage 4: PA  and PM  trade (jointly or with their market alternatives). 
The remuneration 0t  agreed at stage 1 cannot depend on observed investments, for it is 
not possible to specify in advance the delivery of a specific adaptation. So it plays no role in 
determining investment efficiency. The subsequent transfer t , negotiated on top of contract 
Z at stage 3, is the share of PA ’s adaptation surplus that PA  in equilibrium has to give to 
PM , in excess of its adaptation costs. It depends on the stage 3 default payoffs which in turn 
depend on the contractual design and availability of alternative providers, as I will show. 
PM  is assumed to maximize its profits. PA  maximizes the social benefit, net of the 
payment to PM . In this setting, the first-best levels of investments ( **,ie ) maximize 
eeqewiivb −−+−+ )()()( . Hence, they satisfy 
1*)(' =iv  
1*)('*)(' =− eqew  
with **,ie >0. 
As both contracts are with a private provider, in default of renegotiation, I assume that 
PA  is not able to exploit entirely investments i . This is due to the fact that under each type of 
contractual design, PA  and PM  commit to X  at stage 1, they cannot therefore switch to 
alternative trades (except if they break the contract, which is prohibitively expensive). PA  
might however still engage in “side-trades” with other private or public providers 'PM  to 
provide the service adaptation alongside the basic public service provided by PM  (this might 
be possible either through the implementation of a new provider, or through the resort to 
                                                                                                                                                        
course, if the government placed the same weight on the private operator’s utility as on the rest of society, the 
first-best could be achieved. 
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already available alternative provisions).11 Nevertheless, this market access by PA  is rarely 
so effective: (1) PA  may not be able to credibly duplicate the basic service by buying the 
adapted service from 'PM  unless the additional value from adaptation is very high; (2) even 
when it is technologically feasible to have 'PM  provide the adaptation service without the 
basic service, this would waste the economies of scope from having a single party provide and 
coordinate them. To capture PA ’s reduced market access, I assume that PA  only 
appropriates a fraction )1( k− of the adaptation return )(iv 12, where ]1,0]∈k  captures the 
“market-shielding” effect of PPP. This actually boils down to an asset-specificity effect. In 
addition, PM ’s side-trading returns are independent of i  and e , so I normalise PM ’s 
additional side-trade value to 0. 
4.2.1. Effort when the private provider does not bear the demand risk 
Under an availability contract, PA ’s default payoff is:  
)()()1(0 eqivktb −−+−        
  
Normalising PM ’s alternative payoff to 0, PM ’s default payoff is )(0 ewt + . This is due to 
the fact that the contract protects PM ’s cost-reduction efforts, by forcing PA  to pay a fixed 
price for the basic service, provided that performance criteria are met. So PM  appropriates 
the full cost reduction )(ew .  
PA ’s maximal gain from renegotiation is therefore )(ikv .  
PA  and PM ’s renegotiation gains are ½ of this sum. So PA  chooses i to maximise 
[ ] iikveqivktb −+−−+− )(21)()()1(0       (1) 
and PM  chooses e  to maximise 
[ ] eikvewt −++ )(21)(0         (2) 
The first-order conditions are now 
            (3) 
4.2.2. Effort when the private provider bears the demand risk 
When the contract imposes the demand risk on the private provider, in case of non adaptation, 
consumers can sanction the private provider. The magnitude of this faculty depends on the 
availability of alternative providers (in the case of a highway, we can imagine that users, if 
their changing demand is not satisfied, can sanction the private provider by using another 
                                                 
11 I assume that 'PM ’s additional cost of providing the adapted service is the same as for PM . Furthermore, I 
assume competition is such that PA  needs only to compensate 'PM ’s costs. 
12 Recall that )(iv  is PA ’s net benefit, i.e. entails PM ’s costs of adaptation.   
1)(' =ew
k
iv −= 2
2)('
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road, or by taking the train etc. See also the above example with school catering). So, again, I 
use the parameter λ to capture the impact of the pressure exercised by consumers on PM ’s 
remuneration, with the availability contract being equivalent to the setting 1=λ 13. 
Under such a contract, PA  has more power and credibility to exploit investments i . In 
fact, consider that the number of consumers that switch to an alternative provider in case of 
default of renegotiation is such that 0=λ , implying no profits for PM . In such a case, PA  is 
able to appropriate the full margin return )(iv  by negotiating with 'PM  (no market-shielding 
effect any more) because PA  is able to switch – instead of side-trading – to alternative 
trading. Thus, if the impact of the pressure exercised by consumers on PM ’s remuneration is 
λ, PA ’s default payoff is 
)]1(1)[()()1()]1(1)[()())1()1(( 00 λλλλλλλλλ −−−−+−=−−−−+−+− eqivktbeqivktb  
In default of renegotiation, PM  may not appropriate the full cost reduction )(ew . This is 
due to the fact that consumers will switch to alternative provisions, which, in the case of a 
concession contract, will lead to lower profits for PM , and hence a weaker internalisation of 
)(ew  by PM . In addition, PM  may also suffer from the adverse effect on quality )(eq  of the 
cost reduction effort e , but, in case of default, only regarding the consumers that still use the 
service even if it is not adapted. PM ’s default payoff under a concession contract is then 
)]()1()([ 0 eqewt λλ −−+  
PA ’s maximal gain from renegotiation is therefore  
)()1()( ewikv λλ −+   
The gain from renegotiation is shared between the parties through a Nash-bargaining solution, 
so PA  chooses i  to maximise 
        (4) 
and PM  chooses e  to maximise 
            (5) 
The first-order conditions are now 
            (6) 
 
4.3. ACCOUNTABILITY AND INCENTIVES COMPARISONS 
4.3.1. Political accountability 
                                                 
13 I abstract from the transaction costs of designing an availability contract compared to a concession contract, 
which when λ = 1 would favour the concession contract. See the discussion part. 
1
2
)1(
)1(2)(')(' +=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
+
−− λλ
λλeqewkiv λ−= 2
2)('
[ ] iewivkeqivktb −−++−−−−+− )()1()(
2
1)]1(1)[()()1(0 λλλλλλ
[ ] eewivkeqewt −−++−−+ )()1()(
2
1)]()1()([ 0 λλλλ
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The above first-order conditions demonstrate how a contract in which the private provider 
bears the demand risk increases PA ’s incentives to support adaptations from the marginal 
incentive 2)2( k−  of )(' iv in equation 3 to 2)2( kλ−  of )(' iv  in equation 6. Under an 
availability contract, PM  is able to hold up PA  of its investments i , because PA  is not 
totally able to exploit i  by replacing or sidelining an uncooperative PM . Under a concession 
contract, PM  can also be able to hold up PA , but it will depend on the value of λ. More 
specifically, the greater the impact of the pressure exercised by consumers on PM ’s 
remuneration, i.e. the smaller λ, the smaller the renegotiation surplus for PA , so the smaller 
the holdup of PM  of PA ’s adaptation investments. In the case of 0=λ , PA ’s incentives to 
support adaptations when the private provider bears the demand risk, are equivalent to the 
first-best incentives level. Accordingly, )(),(* ACtyContractAvailabiliCCContractConcession iii ≥≥ λ  for any λ. 
The following proposition records these points. 
Proposition 1. Procuring authorities are more attentive and responsive to consumers 
demand when the private provider bears the demand risk. Increasing the impact of the 
pressure exercised by consumers on PM ’s remuneration increases the political 
accountability. So, ACCC ii >)(λ 1<∀λ , and                        0>∀λ . 
Proof. See Appendix  
The proposition, illustrated by the following Figure 3, states that the model in which the 
private provider bears the demand risk (like in concession contracts) always dominates the 
model in which the private provider does not bear any demand risk (like in availability 
contracts) regarding the political accountability, i.e. regarding the incentives given to the 
procuring authority to invest efforts to pay attention to consumers changing demands. 
Intuition follows from the fact that the procuring authority has more credibility in side-trading 
under a concession contract than under an availability contract, since the incumbent private 
provider can experience negative profits. 
Figure 3: Illustration of equilibrium levels of political accountability 
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4.3.2. Private provider’s cost-reducing incentives 
The above first-order conditions also demonstrate how a concession contract decreases PM ’s 
cost-cutting incentives compared to an availability contract. As a matter of fact, the model 
shows that for λ equal to 1, PM ’s cost-cutting incentives under a concession and under an 
availability contract are equivalent and over-optimal. However, when λ tends towards 0, 
PM ’s cost-cutting incentives under a concession contract, CCe , tend to be smaller than under 
an availability contract. They may become exactly equal to *e  for some λ and then continue 
to decrease and get further away so that, for a range of values of λ, there is under-investment 
in e  under a concession contract. Finally, CCe  may be, for λ close to zero, further away from 
*e  than ACe is. The following Figure 4 and proposition illustrate and record these points. 
Figure 4: Illustration of equilibrium levels of private providers’ cost-reducing incentives 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proposition 2. i) The private public-service provider’s incentives to invest in cost-
reducing efforts are smaller when it bears the demand risk than when it does not, i.e. 
CCAC ee ≥  for any λ. Whether the private provider bears the demand risk or not is optimal 
depends on the value of λ and on the functional forms for )(ew  and )(eq . Without making 
further assumptions about the functional forms for q(e) and w(e), it is not possible to pin 
down a particular value of λ that makes the contractual forms equally inefficient. 
ii) Increasing the impact of the pressure exercised by consumers on PM ’s remuneration, 
i.e. a smaller λ, decreases its incentives to invest in cost-reducing efforts, i.e.      
                                  
Therefore, when          , there is a unique value of λ* for which the two contractual forms 
are equally distant from the first best for each form for )(ew  and )(eq . Below this cut-off 
λ*, the contract in which the private provider does not bear the demand risk is optimal, 
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and above this cut-off, the contract in which the private provider bears the demand risk is 
optimal.  
iii) Since CCAC ee ≥  and )(λe  is increasing             , there is a range of values of λ around 
1 where the contract in which the private provider bears the demand risk is always closer 
to the first best than the contract in which the private provider does not bear the demand 
risk. 
Proof. See Appendix  
Intuitively, if the private provider bears the demand risk, it internalizes the negative 
externality of e  according to the potential impact of the consumers’ pressure on its 
remuneration. By contrast, under an availability contract, in case of adaptation or not, PM  
never internalises the adverse quality effect. Then, PM ’s cost reducing efforts under a 
concession contract can only be lower than under an availability contract.  
 In addition, the greater the impact of consumers’ pressure on PM ’s remuneration, the 
more PM  will internalize the negative externality and then the smaller e ; conversely, the 
lower the potential impact of the pressure exercised by consumers on PM ’s remuneration, 
the lower the internalisation by the private provider of the adverse effect on quality of its cost 
reducing investments and hence the higher its cost reducing efforts.  
However, this does not imply that the concession contract always dominates the 
availability contract. As a matter of fact, if λ tends towards zero, there is under-investment in 
e  under a concession contract, and for λ close to zero, depending on the functional forms for 
)(ew  and )(eq , PM ’s cost-reducing incentives when it bears the demand risk might be 
further away from *e  than when it does not bear the demand risk. This is due to the fact that 
in case of non-adaptation and λ close to zero, PM  will not be able to internalise )(ew .  
The fact that PM  may not be able to appropriate the full )(ew  in case of default of 
adaptation when it bears the demand risk explains why availability contracts will be always 
more optimal than concession contracts if we do not consider the effect of cost-reducing 
efforts on quality (since under an availability contract, in case of adaptation or not, PM  
always appropriates the full cost-reduction effort).  
 
The consequence is that clear-cut results are not obtained when we consider the adverse 
effect of e  on quality. Whether the private provider bears the demand risk or not is optimal 
depends on the functional forms for )(ew  and )(eq . Thus, without making further 
assumptions about the functional forms for )(ew  and )(eq , it is not possible to pin down a 
particular value of λ, λ*, that makes the two contractual forms equally inefficient. However, 
for a particular form for )(ew  and )(eq , it is easy to pin down the λ* that makes the two 
contractual forms equally inefficient. The following Figures 5 and 6 give also an illustration 
4
1>∀λ
 - 21 -
of the situations where a contract in which the private provider bears the demand risk is either 
always optimal (Figure 5), or not always optimal (Figure 6). 
Figure 5: Case where the concession contract is always optimal.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this example, we have eew 2)( =  and                  (then the assumptions are satisfied 
for all 4<e ). We have then               (blue line), 1=ACe  (red line),                      (yellow 
line). Then, for all λ , the concession contract is closer to efficiency than the availability 
contract. 
Figure 6: Case where the concession contract is not always optimal.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As for the case where the concession contract is not always optimal, let consider 
eew =)(  and .             . We can see that for smaller values of λ, the concession contract is 
farther from the first-best than the availability contract. In particular, the λ* that makes the 
two contractual forms equally inefficient is approximately 0.355569. 
In addition, these figures illustrate the fact that there is a range of values of λ around 1 
where the contract in which the private provider bears the demand risk is always closer to the 
first best than the contract in which the private provider does not bear the demand risk.  
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In sum, I have shown that it is always optimal to impose the demand risk on the private 
provider regarding the incentives given to procuring authorities to be accountable. As for the 
incentives given to the private provider to reduce costs, there are cases (depending on the 
impact of the consumers pressure on the private provider’s remuneration and on the functional 
forms for the positive and negative effects of the private provider’s cost-cutting efforts) where 
the contract form such as the concession contract does not dominate the contract form such as 
the availability contract. In such cases then, a tradeoff occurs between imposing on the private 
provider the demand risk to raise the accountability and responsiveness of procuring 
authorities to consumers concerns, and not imposing on the private provider the demand risk 
to raise its cost-cutting incentives. Otherwise, when the conditions for such cases are not 
satisfied, the model in which the private provider bears the demand risk always dominates the 
model in which it does not.  
 
5. ENDOGENOUS PRIVATE PROVIDER’S EFFORT 
So far, I have neglected PM ’s potential role in discovering adaptations whereas many studies 
have highlighted the importance of PM ’s incentives to invest in the research into innovative 
approaches to carrying out the service provision (e.g. Hart, Shleifer and Vishny 1997, Besley 
and Ghatak 2001, Hart 2003, Benett and Iossa 2006).  
If we consider that it is not in PM ’s interest to implement a quality innovation without 
renegotiating with PA  over the split of the surplus generated by such an innovation, i.e. if we 
assume that PM  has no private gains from implementing the adaptation, PM ’s adaptation 
incentives would not vary with the contractual design structures I analyse.  
However, if we now relax the assumption that PM  has no private gains from 
implementing an adaptation, the contractual design may have an impact on PM ’s adaptation 
investment incentives. 
5.1. PM ’S ADAPTATION EFFORT UNDER AN AVAILABILITY CONTRACT 
Under an availability contract, it is straightforward that PM  has no incentives to support the 
cost of adaptation efforts without negotiating with PA  over the surplus sharing. This is due to 
the fact that the remuneration of PM  under an availability contract is fixed, provided that 
PM  meets the quality and performance criteria included in the contract, so that PM  receives 
no private gains from implementing the adaptation.   
5.2. PM ’S ADAPTATION EFFORT UNDER A CONCESSION CONTRACT 
Under a concession contract, if PM  invests in adaptation effort j  without any negotiation 
with PA  over the surplus generated by such an investment, PM ’s payoff is 
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 jeqewt −−−+ )()1()(0 λ . 
If PM  does not invest in adaptation effort and then does not adapt the service according 
to consumers’ demand, his payoff is [ ])()1()(0 eqewt λλ −−+ . In fact, in default of 
adaptation, consumers will switch to alternative adapted provisions whenever possible, which, 
in the case of a concession contract, will lead to lower profits for PM .  
PM ’s maximal gain from adaptation is therefore [ ] jeqewt −−−+− )()1()()1( 0 λλ . 
Thus, since PM has control rights, it will implement the adaptation whenever it receives 
private gains from doing so, i.e. whenever the following condition is met 
[ ] jeqewt >−−+− )()1()()1( 0 λλ         (7) 
This condition implies that, if the demand shock (e.g. taste shock), reflected by λ, is large (i.e. 
λ tends towards 0) and that the corresponding cost shock, reflected by j , is small (i.e. j  
tends towards 0), then PM  will have incentives to support j  without any negotiation with 
PA  over the surplus generated by his investment, because it will receive private gains from 
doing so. 
This leads to the following proposition: 
Proposition 3. If [ ] jeqewt >−−+− )()1()()1( 0 λλ , i.e. if the demand shock tends to be  
large and the cost shock of the adaptation tends to be small, then the private provider has 
more incentives to invest in adaptation efforts under a concession contract than under an 
availability contract. 
This proposition is consistent with existing evidence on how concession contracts are 
working. For example, the main private concessionaire of highways in France has 
implemented a new radio station in order to offer better real-time information to users on the 
traffic, without renegotiating with the government any toll adaptation. While interviewing this 
private provider, it admitted that he had incentives to implement the innovation because the 
cost of the implementation was low and the consequent impact on demand could be large so 
that it expected private gains from doing so. 
This proposition shows that when the private provider bears the demand risk, it can have, 
under certain conditions, a direct accountability to consumers; that is even if the contract 
remains between the procuring authority and the private provider, some market accountability 
is feasible.  
5.3. COMPLEMENTARITY AND SUBSTITUTABILITY IN ACCOUNTABILITY 
The model shows that, under certain conditions, a concession contract increases both PA ’s 
accountability and PM ’s incentives regarding non anticipated service-provision adaptation. 
The question that is raised now is to know whether these efforts are complementary or 
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substitutes. In fact, it could be useless to speak about political accountability if PM ’s 
incentives could be enough to make PM  adapt the public service to satisfy the changes in the 
effective consumers demand.  
First, the model shows that when the demand shock of an adaptation is small and the 
corresponding cost shock is large, PM does not receive any private gains from implementing 
the adaptation, i.e. it will not have any incentives to implement the adaptation unilaterally. In 
such a case then – which is most often the case, PM  and PA  will have to renegotiate the 
contract and a greater PA ’s accountability increases the probability that the adaptation 
implemented will please consumers.  
Second, even when the conditions that make PM  adapt the service unilaterally when it 
bears the demand risk are satisfied, PA ’s accountability and PM ’s incentives can be 
complementary. As a matter of fact, even if there is no renegotiation over whether to 
implement the adaptation since PM  will implement the adaptation without any further 
inducement, PA  and PM  can communicate over the adaptation itself (e.g. over the actual 
change in consumers preferences) because a better knowledge by PM  of the consumers 
preferences can increase PM ’s private gains. In such a case, the greater is PA ’s 
attentiveness, the more sense it makes for PM  to investigate how to satisfy consumers 
demand. Conversely, the greater PM ’s efforts, the more PA  can gain from investigating 
consumers concerns and being responsive to them. Thus, some degree of complementarity 
can be present and hence the model in which the private provider bears the demand risk can 
even more dominate the model in which it does not bear the demand risk, as highlighted by 
the following proposition. 
Proposition 4. If political accountability and private public-service provider’s efforts in 
adaptation are complements, then this complementarity raises the benefit from imposing 
the demand risk on the private provider. It has no effect on e. 
 
6. DEMAND RISK OR DEFAULT RISK 
So far, we have considered that the payments from PA  to PM , provided that performance 
criteria are met, are guaranteed when the private provider does not bear the demand risk. But 
this absence of “demand risk” under contracts such as the availability contract could be an 
illusion. As a matter of fact, the payments to PM  depend on PA ’s budget, i.e. on the 
capacity of PA  to pay. So we can imagine that in periods of tiny budgets, PA  might have 
some problems to pay PM  when the latter does not bear the demand risk14. We can expect 
that the likelihood of such a default risk will be higher in less developed countries than in 
                                                 
14 I consider in this section that when the private provider bears the demand risk, his payments do not depend on 
the procuring authority’s budgets (it means that I exclude from the analysis the shadow toll contracts).  
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developed countries. Nevertheless, when procuring authorities are local entities, such a risk 
can occur whether the country is wealthy or not (e.g. the city of Angoulême in France that 
went bankrupt in 1991, and was then unable to honour any of its commitments). 
So let consider now the possibility of a default risk when the private provider does not 
bear the demand risk. In particular, I use the parameter γ  to capture the probability of the 
absence of procuring authorities’ default risk, with [ ]1,0∈γ 15. While this parameter might 
affect PM ’s cost-reducing incentives, it will not have any impact on the political 
accountability. Therefore, repeating the exercise of the section 4 and focusing on PM ’s cost-
reducing incentives, we have PA  and PM ’s overall payoffs from Z : 
iiveqttbuPA −+−+−= )()()( 0γ  
eewttuPM −++= ))(( 0γ  
PA ’s default payoff is then )()1()(0 ivkeqtb −+−− γ  
PM ’s default payoff is ))(( 0 ewt +γ  
PA ’s maximal gain from renegotiation is therefore )(ikv .  
PA  and PM ’s renegotiation gains are ½ of this sum. So PM  chooses e  to maximise 
[ ] eikvewt −++ )(21))(( 0γ         (8) 
The first-order conditions is now 
            (9) 
The above first-order condition demonstrates how an availability contract decreases 
PM ’s cost-cutting incentives compared to a concession contract when         . As a matter of 
fact, the model shows that for γ  equal to   , PM ’s cost-cutting incentives under an 
availability contract are equivalent to the ones under a concession contract for 0=λ  and 
under-optimal. However, when γ  tends towards 0, PM ’s cost-cutting incentives under an 
availability contract tend to be smaller than under a concession contract, since the effort of the 
private provider under an availability contract is increasing inγ . So we need λ* to increase so 
as to rebalance the two contractual forms. As this process continues and γ  gets small, λ* gets 
high, and hence the concession contract tends to be more often optimal. 
When               , the efforts under a concession contract can be superior or inferior than the 
efforts under an availability contract. More specifically, the concession contract will be more 
optimal for intermediate range of values of λ, whereas for extreme values the availability 
contract will be more optimal.  
This leads to the following proposition: 
                                                 
15 Thus, when 1=γ ,  it means that the likelihood of procuring authorities’ default risk is equal to zero and, 
conversely, when 0=γ , the likelihood of default risk is equal to one. 
1)('* =ewγ
2
1≤γ
2
1
⎢⎣
⎡⎢⎣
⎡∈ 1,
2
1γ
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Proposition 5. For         , as the likelihood of default risk of public authorities gets high, 
i.e. γ  gets small, λ* is weakly increasing, i.e. the contract in which the private provider bears 
the demand risk tends to be more often optimal.  
In addition, increasing the likelihood of PA ’s default risk, i.e. a smallerγ , 
decreases PM ’s incentives to invest in cost-reducing efforts.  
Proof. See Appendix 
Intuitively, if the private provider bears the risk of default of the procuring authority, it 
may not be able to internalize the positive effect of e . More precisely, the higher the 
likelihood of default of the procuring authority, the less PM  will internalize the positive 
effect and then the smaller e ; conversely, the lower the likelihood of default of the procuring 
authority, the greater the internalisation by the private provider of the cost savings of its cost 
reducing investments and hence the higher his cost reducing efforts. PM ’s efforts are then 
increasing in γ . 
In sum, considering the potentiality of default of procuring authorities tends to make the 
concession contract be more often optimal than the availability contract, under certain 
conditions, regarding the cost-cutting incentives of the private provider. This might explain 
why we do not observe as many availability contracts in less developed countries as in 
developed countries, since the default risk of procuring authorities in such countries can be 
very high (γ  tends towards zero). However, as already highlighted, such a default risk can 
also occur in developed countries (e.g. when the procuring authority is a local entity) but the 
probability of occurrence is lower than in less developed countries.   
 
7. DISCUSSION 
Overall, the model highlights that contracts in which the private provider does not bear the 
demand risk, even though they permit to reduce the likelihood of renegotiation – to the extent 
that low demand realizations are often at the heart of opportunistic renegotiations initiated by 
firms –, are not always optimal. In other words, I have pointed out that there is a tradeoff 
between using concession contracts to raise private providers’ and public authorities’ 
incentives to be responsive to consumers concerns, and resorting to availability contracts to 
limit the likelihood of renegotiation. Thus, this tradeoff will mainly depend on the following 
criteria: (a) the possibility for consumers to exercise pressure on private providers’ revenue, 
(b) the default risk, and (c) the likelihood of renegotiation.  
Taking into account these three criteria, it is possible to make some predictions on the 
contractual form that would best fit a particular sector.  
2
1≤γ
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7.1. SPECULATION 
Let first consider the case of water supply. In such a case, the availability of alternative 
provisions for consumers is rather limited (they can however still buy bottles of water). Thus, 
procuring authorities cannot credibly threaten the incumbent private provider in side-trading it 
in case of default of adaptation of the service provision. Are availability contracts then better 
suited to this sector? The tradeoff will depend on the likelihood of renegotiation versus the 
likelihood of default of the procuring authority.  
For road projects, consumers have most often the choice between alternative provisions 
(e.g. trains, alternative roads), so that the impact of the consumers’ pressure on the private 
provider’s remuneration can be significant16. Concession contracts will therefore dominate 
availability contracts regarding the allocative efficiency. However, the quality of roads is 
largely contractible, so that we can expect a very low effect of cost-reducing investments on 
quality. The model highlights that when there is no effect of cost-reducing investments on 
quality, availability contracts always dominate concession contracts regarding the incentives 
of the private provider to cut costs. In addition, the uncertainty associated with future traffic is 
very high and exogenous (Pickrell 1990, Flyvbjerg and Skamris 1997, Athias and Nunez 
2007), making toll road concessions particularly prone to renegotiation issues (Engel et al. 
2002, 2006, Guasch 2004, Estache 2006). A clear prediction in this sector is therefore not 
possible, but will tend to favour the use of availability contracts in this sector.  
By contrast, we can expect that contracts in which the private provider bears the demand 
risk will be more suitable for the management of schools (included school catering services) 
and hospitals where there is a diversity of provisions and a low uncertainty on the future 
demand.  
These results are generally consistent with existing evidence on how PFI is working, 
compared to concession contracts. According to a report commissioned by the Treasury 
Taskforce (Arthur and Andersen and Enterprise LSE 2000), PFI appears to have worked well 
for roads, generating substantial cost saving, though it has worked less well for schools and 
hospitals. 
7.2. A CONTINUUM CHOICE OF CONTRACTS RATHER THAN BINARY  
It is contractually possible to restrict the demand risk imposed on the private provider within a 
concession contract (Athias and Saussier 2007), so that public authorities do not face a binary 
choice of contracts but a continuum choice. 
However, this does not question the results I obtained to the extent that the weaker the 
extent to which the private provider bears the demand risk, the weaker the potential impact of 
                                                 
16 Again, and particularly in the road sector, a marginal variation in the demand can be sufficient to generate 
negative profits for the private provider. 
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the consumers’ pressure on its remuneration, i.e. the higher the λ, and hence the weaker the 
advantages to resort to concession contracts, everything else being equal.  
7.3. VOUCHER PROVISION, TRANSACTION COSTS AND POLITICAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
The model developed in this paper underpins the standard argument for voucher provision of 
public services. The state provides the citizens with a voucher that entitles the individual to a 
particular service (or it could be a monetary amount) and they then choose where to spend 
that voucher. A better matching between consumers and providers is therefore reached. This 
attenuates incentive problems and increases organizational efficiency by economizing on the 
need for explicit incentives. This can explain why the transaction costs of designing a contract 
in which the private provider bears the demand risk are much lower than those associated with 
the design of a contract in which the private provider does not bear the demand risk. 
This paper also addresses the broader question of how to increase the political 
accountability and more specifically if it is possible to increase the political accountability by 
empowering the consumers, i.e. by allowing them to oust a firm when this one bears the 
demand risk. I show that, in the particular case I analyse, the political accountability is higher 
when consumers are empowered. 
7.4. COMPARISON WITH THE PUBLIC PROVISION  
While Ellman (2006) finds that it is always optimal to have in-house provision relative to 
contracting out provision regarding the political and public accountability, I show that under 
some conditions, the contracting-out model in which the private provider bears the demand 
risk might dominate the public provision since it allows political accountability as well as 
cost-reducing investments.  
 
8. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, I have studied the effects of imposing the demand risk on the private provider 
on the accountability of procuring authorities regarding consumers changing demands and on 
the adaptation effort incentives of the private public-service provider. Thus, not only private 
providers, but also public authorities, can be expropriated ex post of a part of the surplus 
generated by their efforts to investigate and satisfy consumers’ changing demand. 
The model shows that the contract form in which the private provider bears the demand 
risk always dominates the one in which it does not bear the demand risk regarding the 
incentives given to procuring authorities and private providers to be responsive to consumers 
concerns.  
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As for the incentives given to the private provider to reduce costs, there are cases 
(depending on the impact of consumers’ pressure on the private provider’s remuneration and 
on the functional forms of the positive and negative effects of the private provider’s cost-
cutting efforts) where the contract form such as the concession contract does not dominate the 
contract form such as the availability contract. In such cases then, a tradeoff occurs between 
imposing the demand risk on the private provider to raise the accountability of procuring 
authorities, and not imposing the demand risk on the private provider to raise his cost-cutting 
incentives. Considering the potentiality of default of procuring authorities tends to make the 
concession contract be more often optimal than the availability contract, under certain 
conditions, regarding the cost-cutting incentives of the private provider.  
The contribution of the paper is twofold. First, it puts the emphasis on the political 
accountability, so far neglected, in the alignment on service provision preferences. It sheds 
some insights on the impact of the contractual design of Public Private Partnerships on this 
accountability mechanism and questions the trend towards the greater resort to contracts 
where firms bear little or no demand risk around the world. Second, it contributes to the 
broader literature on the political economy of government responsiveness. It is in fact related 
to the literature on voucher provision of public services and demonstrates that empowering 
consumers of public services strengthens incentives for governments to be responsive. 
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APPENDIX 
 
A. Proof of Proposition 1 
 The first-order condition when the private provider bears the demand risk is   
                              , or, equivalently, 2))((')2( =− λλ ivk . 
 
Taking the derivative with respect to λ yields 0))((')('))(('')2( =−− λλλλ ikviivk  
Rearranging and solving for )(' λi :  
 
 
Since v  is concave as well as 10 ≤≤ λ  and 10 ≤< k , the denominator is always negative 
and the numerator is always positive. Therefore, )(' λi  is always negative.  
 
B. Proof of Proposition 2 
B.1. Proof of proposition 2 ii) 
The first-order condition when the private provider bears the demand risk is   
 
 
or, equivalently, 2)))((')1(2())((')1( =−−+ λλλλλ eqew . 
Taking the derivative with respect to λ yields 
0)))((')42()('))(('')1(2())((')('))(('')1( =−−−−++ λλλλλλλλλλ eqeeqeweew . 
Rearranging and solving for )(' λe : 
  
 
Since w  is concave and q  is convex (as well as 10 ≤≤ λ ), the denominator is always 
negative. Since '' qw−  is always positive, the numerator is also always negative for            .  
Therefore, when            , )(' λe  is always positive.  
 
C. Proof of Proposition 5 
k
iv λ−= 2
2)('
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The first-order condition is   
 
 
Taking the derivative with respect to γ  yields 
. 
Rearranging and solving for )(' γe : 
  
 
Since w  is concave, the denominator and the numerator are also always negative. Therefore, 
)(' γe  is always positive.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1))((' =γγ ew
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))((')(' γγ
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